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U. S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright stated that Ukraine had achieved "substantial progress"
in solving the problems connected to a number of complaints from American investors. According to
the American law, Mrs. Albright's statement had to be made before April 30, 1998; otherwise the
Congress would have reduced by half the amount of foreign assistance funds earmarked for Ukraine.
At some point, the issue of American assistance "hang on a hair": too many American companies
complained about Ukraine both in private discussions and publicly. The complaints proved to be
something more serious than just the Gala Radio case: the company's grievances were supported by
major American business actors, including the Monsanto, the Cargill, the Coca-Cola, the McDonald's,
the Proctor and Gamble and the Du Pond. The avalanche of complaints was so sweeping that many lost
temper, and even Senator Mitch McConnel, often called "Mr. Ukraine" for his favor for this country,
publicly stated that he would no more support appropriation of foreign assistance to Ukraine.
Here we should note the rather rapid reaction of the Ukrainian top-ranking officials who began to
discuss, if not solve, the problems of foreign investors. For some time, Ukraine's leaders changed the
notorious "we've-got-our-own-state-with-our-own-laws" for a more pragmatic "we-need-help-we-need-
investments". I do not mean the visit of presidential chief of staff Yevhen Kushnariov to Washington
D.C.: his public statements convinced Americans that they'd better deal with Secretary of the National
Security and Defence Council Volodymyr Horbulin. However, at one point , a substantial effort was
made to make things clear, to find understanding with some and scare others, and to try and find a
solution. The principle "cash now, carry later" on the Ukrainian part resulted in a rather clumsy push to
produce something tangible that could be "carried" in exchange for the promised cash.
To a certain extent, all these actions made the tone of Mrs. Albright's speech rather tense and showed
that the Ukrainian party could produce action when it is willing to. According to the U. S. Secretary of
State, the United States may refrain from providing financial assistance to the Ukrainian government in
the fields where the reforms have stopped, and where the assistance cannot be used effectively. The
judgement was motivated by anxiety over the government's failure to solve American investors'
problems, as well as by unfavorable investment climate in Ukraine and the slow pace of economic
reforms. As economic reform priorities, Mrs. Albright quoted settlement of twelve investment disputes,
and concrete steps aiming at improving the investment climate, including creation of a more
transparent procedures of supply and licensing, reforms of the legislation, stronger guarantees of
shareholders' rights, enforcement of court judgements, and adoption of a strict ethical civil service
code. According to the U. S. Secretary of State, if within the upcoming months the American
government does not see that reforms are going ahead, that the assistance is being used effectively, and
that a substantial progress has been achieved, the funds will be retargeted at other private and
nongovernmental spheres of the economy. Therefore, responding to the Ukrainian officials' skill of
making something similar to what is required, the Americans decided to demonstrate the imaginary
pack of dollar notes.
The decision adopted by the Americans is rather mild, compared to what could have been. Ukrainian
and American radicals' demands to stop the American assistance altogether, expecting that the step
would prompt the Ukrainian government to start real reforms cannot be seen as justified: the US$ 225
million is not the amount sufficient for undertaking reforms of the scale and scope needed in Ukraine.
Rather, the money is a symbol of a certain level of trust that still remains in the United States to
Ukraine, it is the dim glow of the "strategic partnership", and the American policy's "carrot and stick".
The deterioration of the American policy to the simple dilemma "to give or not to give" suggests that
the Clinton administration does not have a comprehensive considerate policy towards Ukraine. Phrases
like "slow pace of economic reforms" and "unfavorable investment climate" are designed to screen not
only the anxiety about the fact that reforms in Ukraine have practically stopped and that there is
nothing much to provide assistance for, but also the fact that the current domestic political situation
leaves no hope that the reforms will be pursued at all. The American approach is not a carte blanche for
the reform process - nobody is giving it now - but a suggestion that the assistance may undergo major
restructuring. The retargeting of the American assistance from the state-owned to the nongovernmental
sector, if it does occur, will mean not only the no-confidence gesture to the Ukrainian government and
the lack of trust in the latter's ability and willingness to carry out reforms: it will also signify a certain
change in the U. S. policy towards Ukraine, from assisting the state to funding Ukrainian
nongovernmental "influence groups" that are capable of forcing the state into undertaking reforms.
However, there is a noteworthy obstacle to the American intention - if any - to retarget the assistance
money to the nongovernmental sector: there are no influential political circles in Ukraine that would
serve as a backing for the U. S. policy like, for instance, the Baltic states, Turkey or Armenia. The
Rukh is largely compromised by their own inconsistency in statements and actions, while the party of
Reforms and Order, led by prominent economist Victor Pynzenyk, lacks access to power. Awareness of
the lack of such "influence groups" in Ukraine enhances United States' officials' disbelieve in fast
success of Ukrainian reforms.
Regretfully, such attitude to Ukraine is justified. The Ukrainian decision-makers prefer to account for
their "difficult childhood" and the "lack of vitamins" by references to the "left-wing danger" and
conspiracy of the "mean" legislature, but many in Washington D.C. no longer believe the multiple
repetitions of those arguments, no matter how real and important they may be. Consider, for instance,
the judgement of one of 32 ad hoc parliamentary investigation commissions of the previous Verkhovna
Rada. The commission, established to verify the circumstances of establishment, activities and
bankruptcy of a Ukrainian-American joint venture, the Borshchahovsky Chemico-Pharmaceutical
Factory, announced that another commission, led by Vice Prime Minister Serhiy Tihipko, assisted
"extrajudicial settlement" of foreign investors' problems. Another example is the task, given by the
parliament to Speaker Oleksandr Moroz to "serve U. S. Ambassador in Ukraine with copies of petitions
of American senators and congressmen in defence of the company" (i.e., the P. J. Trading), and to
"inform the Congress and the Senate of the USA about the facts of pressure exerted by some senators
and congressmen on the Ukrainian executive authorities for the purpose of illicit extrajudicial
settlement of business disputes." Other examples of the previous parliament's opposition to reforms
include blocking the large privatization by means of listing practically all investment-attractive
enterprises among the property that is "not subject to privatization due to its national importance", and
Oleksandr Moroz's vehement opposition to privatization of land, expressed in statements like "pseudo-
theoreticians of the land reform impose the idea of destruction of collective farms through what at the
first glance appears to be attractive division of land into individual parcels, which in half a year may
cause the ruination of all suburban farms".
The arguments, connected with the parliament, are not accepted in Washington D.C. not only because
people over there remember Mr. Moroz's rather pro-American statements about "important American
assistance to the Ukrainian military-industrial complex" (March 31, 1995), his suggestion that the U. S.
should initiate an international conference on the issues of security in the Black Sea region (April 10,
1995), and his statements like "Ukraine is prepared to establish joint ventures with foreign investors for
the development of its transportation infrastructure, and can provide such enterprises in the
construction industry with materials and labor force". Obviously, Mr. Moroz tends to "shy" between
those statements and his "chants" about "Lenin as a cosmic phenomenon" and "the global role of the
Great October".
Ukraine's problem is that its executive branch also cannot be seen as a model of consistency in
fulfilling its own vows. I am not speaking here about the outrageous fact that Ukrainian officials quote
different figures every time they are asked about the cost of closing down the Chernobyl nuclear power
plant, nor about the obscure difference between closing down the Chernobyl NPP and a "political
decision about closing it". Evidently, some of president Kuchma's statements may be viewed as
"situationally justified", like, for instance, presidential candidate Kuchma's statement on May 17, 1994,
that "the sense and design of the IMF model was to pull technologically backward former USSR
countries to the world market, after destroying all their enterprises and industries able to compete with
Western firms' products." But what about his recent statement that have not been forgotten yet? In
August 1997, Leonid Kuchma claimed that "… our market reforms became kind of a challenge not
only to the domestic left-wing opposition - which is understandable anyway - but to Western states,
although they have made unequivocal statements about support for those reforms'" How can something
nonexistent be a challenge to anything? Meanwhile, president Kuchma's statement that he had
information about "facts of bribing Ukrainian structures by some American firms" (April 1997) and
that "some American firms engage in bribing Ukrainian structures in order to try and get access to
technical [assistance] loans provided to Ukraine by international financial institutions" are serious
enough to be supported with adequate sentences of Ukrainian or American courts.
Without that one can hardly hope that Ukraine will be viewed in the U. S. as a country where not only
every bureaucrat's word is as good as gold, but the president, democratically elected by the people, is
responsible for his words. Meanwhile, tiny achievements in the Ukrainian-American relations - like
mutual concessions on the issue of Ukraine's involvement in building a nuclear power plant in the town
of Busher in Iran - are submerged by statements like the ones quoted above. The issue of assistance,
after all, is not that important. What really matters is understanding of responsibility for making sure
that the assistance funds are used appropriately, and that Ukraine abides by its obligations and carefully
fulfils its promises. Then there will be no need to apply the "cash now carry later" principle, the
exchange will be direct and immediate and everybody will get what he needs.
